Human Events *A Weekly Analysis for the American Citizen*
Editorial Office 1710 Rhode Island Ave., N. W., WASHINGTON 6, D. C. *Telephone* NATIONAL 2066
VOL. VI, NO. 50, *Issue Number* 307, DECEMBER 14, 1949 ★ *Editors:* FELIX MORLEY & FRANK C. HANIGHEN

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA RECEIVED DEC 19 1949

CHINA AND BIPARTISANISM

By Henry P. Fletcher

The public outcry in connection with the Ward and other cases of detention of Americans in China is essentially a protest against the inept Chinese policy of our Government. There is a justified feeling of frustration, in view of our historic policy of friendship with China.

Our State Department is twisting and turning on the horns of a dilemma of its own creation. In the White Paper on China it clearly indicated that it was through with the Chiang Kai-shek regime. But it hesitates to extend even de facto recognition to the government of Mao Tse-tung, fearing that would encourage the spread of Communism in Asia.

President Wilson was the first to depart from our traditional (Jeffersonian) policy of automatic recognition for stable governments. Now it seems that we must first approve of their ideological concepts or their willingness to conform to U. S. standards of democracy. This change has brought on a series of diplomatic crises, with increasing intervention in the domestic affairs of a number of countries.

We now come to the forks of the road in our relations with China. Diplomacy cannot act in a vacuum. I am certainly no sympathizer with Communism, nor indifferent to its spread in Europe or Asia or America, but we are confronted in China with a condition as well as a theory. Until recently the United States has been considered by the Chinese people as their best and most disinterested friend. We alone of the Great Powers refrained from infringement on the territorial integrity of China and have consistently championed China's interests in her relations with the rest of the world. Indeed, our friendly attitude toward China was the direct cause of our war with Japan. It is sad to think that after this costly struggle we find China no better off than before our intervention on her behalf and our position there seriously compromised.

That this is so is the result of our failure to grasp the realities of the Far Eastern situation. Anyone familiar with the history of China knows that Chinese governmental weakness had led to continual encroachment on its sovereignty and territorial integrity and that the principal struggle for dominance and territorial acquisitions was between Russia and Japan. So it should have been anticipated that if Japan was pushed out of China, the Russians would endeavor to move in.

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II

Our Government had ample warning during the course of the war. Russia's pointed aloofness from contact at the various conferences with our Chinese ally and Russia's calculated delay in joining our war with Japan, were both indications that the Communist Government had not abandoned the Russian nationalist-expansion policy hitherto pursued in China. For one week's participation in the War, we gave the Kremlin advantages which practically assured its present dominant position in China. So we lost the fruits of our victory in the Pacific. In slang expression the Russians simply made monkeys of Roosevelt, Hopkins and Stettinius, and of the amiable body of amateurs in charge of our foreign relations at that time.

While Russia was helping the Communists in China to undermine and overthrow the Chiang Government, and was vigorously extending her hegemony in Eastern Europe, the Administration suddenly woke up. Beginning with the Truman policy in Greece we started on the cold war of containment of Russia in Europe. This brings us inevitably to consideration of the bipartisan foreign policy.

Let us go back to the inception of this hybrid foreign policy, which in my opinion has deprived our country of a real and effective opposition and has had a most corrosive effect on the two-party system of Government.

Franklin Roosevelt cleverly initiated this crippling policy in 1940. On the eve of the Republican Convention in Philadelphia he baited his hook to catch Landon and Knox -- the Republican nominees for President and Vice President in the previous campaign -- as members of his Cabinet. Landon refused to accept unless Roosevelt would publicly announce that he would not run for a third term. But Knox, who had been designated as the Illinois member of the important Platform Committee, jumped at the chance. And Henry Stimson, an ardent sympathizer with American aid to the Allies, joined up in place of Landon and became Secretary of War.

At the Philadelphia Convention, the Republicans nominated a former Democrat, Wendell Willkie, who was satisfactory to the interventionist elements of the Republican Party, and we were on our way. Roosevelt easily defeated this attractive but politically inexperienced opponent and we entered the War by way of Pearl Harbor. Once in the War the Republican Party of course gave loyal support to the war effort.

III

As the War drew to a close, our Government in 1944 called the Dumbarton Oaks conference with Russia, Britain and China, to consider and frame a post-war policy for the maintenance of World Peace. Secretary

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Hull invited a former Chairman of the Republican National Committee who had had diplomatic experience to participate. At this juncture Mr. Dewey, who had just been nominated as the Republican candidate to oppose Roosevelt and who had not been consulted about this appointment, sent Mr. John Foster Dulles to see Mr. Hull to be sure he was personally represented in this situation. As the Presidential campaign progressed Dewey identified himself with the Hull-Roosevelt policy. Dewey was defeated. The war ended.

Having easily disposed of Dewey, President Roosevelt then looked over the Republican field to see if he could secure other Republican recruits for his bipartisan policy. He selected two prospective and potential Republican Presidential candidates -- Senator Vandenberg and ex-Governor Stassen -- as members of the American delegation to the San Francisco Conference which set up the United Nations Organization.

Governor Stassen had been an enthusiastic Willkie-ite and One-Worlder but Senator Vandenberg had been a Borah Isolationist. However, like Saul of Tarsus on the road to Damascus, he saw the light and became almost overnight the Republican apostle of bipartisanism, which thereupon went into high gear. Messrs. Vandenberg and Dulles attended the Conference which implemented the United Nations Charter. Vice-President Truman succeeded to the White House and promptly picked another prominent Republican -- Senator Warren Austin -- to succeed Mr. Stettinius as the principal U. S. representative at the United Nations.

And so we come to the Presidential campaign of last year. At the Republican Convention the Vandenberg candidacy folded very quickly, Taft and Stassen were bowled over and Dewey became the standard bearer for the second time. Vandenberg, Dulles and the internationalists were sitting pretty. The election was in the bag. It was not necessary to defend the Republican record in the Eightieth Congress -- foreign policy was not even debated. Dewey was in -- until the votes were counted.

IV

With Mr. Truman's re-election his doctrine for the containment of Communism in Europe took on added impetus. Intervention in Greece had been followed by the Marshall Plan and this led straight to the Atlantic Alliance and the arming of Western Europe -- all of these moves entailing a crushing and continuing burden on the American taxpayer. Anyone then or now who dares to question the wisdom or efficacy of these fruits of the bipartisan foreign policy is branded from the housetops as a blind isolationist. But Republican advocates of bipartisanism, like ex-Senator Dulles, do not for that reason receive White House favor.

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Now the ridiculous and palpable inconsistencies of this policy can no longer be concealed by a pleasant name. We are giving political, economic and financial aid to the avowed Communist Tito in Yugoslavia -- the same Tito who massacred in cold blood the American airmen who were forced down in his territory. The reason for this is that we think maybe Tito is hostile to Russia. Yet we maintain diplomatic relations with Russia as well as Tito and also with the Communist satellites in Europe. But we hesitate to recognize the Communist satellite in China, even though the Nationalist Government of China is reduced to control of Formosa, which until we write a peace treaty is legally a part of Japan.

In spite of all our military and financial aid the former Nationalist Government has not been able to maintain itself, yet it is now argued that we should organize and equip a new Chinese Army (under MacArthur perhaps) to save Indo-China, Burma and Malaya from Communism.

It does not seem to be recognized by the newspaper and Congressional experts now advocating forceful measures that serious incidents may easily arise and that we could very soon be in another war not only with China but sooner or later with Russia as well. Should we win that war we would be saddled with responsibility for the well-being of four hundred million people in a starved and devastated land. A Marshall Plan for China and the Far East would make what we are now spending to restore Europe look like peanuts.

On the other hand nobody seems willing publicly to admit that if Great Britain and other European countries recognize the "Red" Government of China we shall eventually be forced to do so, whether we like it or not.

Behind this tangle lies a Constitutional fact that needs emphasis. The President alone has the final power and responsibility in this question of recognition and Mr. Truman cannot dodge it indefinitely. Whatever he does will presumably mean the end of the bipartisan foreign policy, for it would be absurd to expect the opposition to share the responsibility for the Administration's dismal record in China.

Henry P. Fletcher, former Ambassador and Undersecretary of State, was Chairman of the Republican National Committee, 1934-36.

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Not Merely Gossip *A Supplement to* Human Events Vol. VI, No. 50

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By Frank C. Hanighen December 14, 1949

IS THE FRANCO REGIME FACING A POLITICAL BREAKDOWN? After my recent visit to Spain, I feel justified in giving a rather definite "no" to this question. My verdict is not based on, although it was influenced by, the opinions of newspapermen and other observers in Madrid. The smart boys in any capital -- as Washington scribes discovered bitterly on November 3, 1948 -- can err badly. For my part, I was strongly affected by a source, of a kind not usually consulted by visiting journalists in Spain. I may say that my informant is an agent sent to Spain two years ago by another European government for the purpose of determining the strength of the anti-Franco Underground. Himself a former trade-union official and pro-Loyalist, he has enjoyed the confidence of Underground leaders in Spain. He described the situation as follows:

"The Underground is very weak, a fact which many Loyalist sympathizers outside Spain little realize. Numerically, it amounts to only about 20,000 out of the 29 million population of Spain. The bulk of these are from the old UGT and CNT (the two big Labor federations existing before the Civil War). The leaders, of course, would love to throw bombs, mount the barricades, pull strikes and slowdowns. But, they readily admit that they are too weak and the Franco security police is too strong. Any such demonstrations would be 'premature'. Incidentally, these leaders laugh at the belief, prevalent in France, U.S. and England, that various violent incidents reported in the outside press -- such as train robberies -- are their work. 'That is flattering, but not true. Bandits pull those jobs.' So long as the Underground rank and file maintain their present quiescence, they have little trouble in eluding the secret police. Followers from time to time distribute mimeographed or typewritten manifestos, but on a very small scale. There is no Underground printing press -- a fact significant of the weakness of the movement. The leaders, nevertheless, live in the hope that 'something' will happen to favor their cause. They doubt that any economic troubles will force Franco to surrender his power. But should Franco encounter very dangerous conditions, they gloomily fear that he will hand over his power to a group of generals who will be even more severe on the Underground. Hence my conclusion is that there is little chance for an overthrow of the Franco regime in the foreseeable future." So far as I am concerned, this verdict clinches the matter.

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IS THE FRANCO REGIME FACING AN ECONOMIC BREAKDOWN? It is true that the economic situation is bad. An 18-month drought with consequent food and electric power troubles, lack of capital goods, lack of foreign exchange to purchase abroad, and other factors -- all present a darkling picture. And the standard of living, for all classes, has been going down. This unhappy panorama has whetted hopes among anti-Franco partisans outside of Spain that the jig is up for the Caudillo. Expert economists on the ground, however, say "no". They concede that, including Acts of God as factors, a truly impossible economic situation is conceivable (although not probable). But even so, they warn, it would take at least two years, and more likely four years, to produce the chaos hoped for by Loyalist sympathizers. These observers emphasize that the Spanish people -- unlike, for instance, the French or British -- have a greater capacity for enduring hardship; they have been used to little else for centuries. Also, these observers stress the fundamentally agricultural pattern of Spain. The peasants feed themselves and somehow or other get sufficient food to urban areas to sustain life. It is estimated that about one-third of the food consumed by the inhabitants of Madrid comes to them through unofficial

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channels, that is by-passes the government rationing controls. "Many a little cart", it is remarked, "which comes into the capital has concealed in it some food for a relative, a friend or an old customer. The government simply cannot control that traffic."

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WHAT KIND OF A DICTATORSHIP? Both opponents and partisans of Franco have badly obscured the real nature of the Spanish governmental setup. It is not a bloody, iron-fist, Fascist-clerical-corporative one-man dictatorship. Neither is it a wise, benevolent, democratic, Platonic rule by a be-chevroned philosopher-as-king. The Franco regime is a military dictatorship, with more resemblance to various Latin-American regimes than to anything in Eastern Europe, or to the late Fascist regimes of Hitler and Mussolini. Anyone who seeks to find the locus of sovereignty in Spain must end by assigning the decisive role to the Army. Franco's power derives from the fact that he understands admirably the care and feeding of generals. There is an independent group of military men, which offers an alternative pole of power should things go to pieces. For the present, however, this group sees no good reason why Franco should not remain in power and in no way opposes him. Such a picture would not be difficult to find in any one of a dozen Latin-American republics, whatever might be the official designations and trappings.

Nor is Franco a blood-thirsty Pretorian. He apparently leads a sort of humdrum private life (which he prefers to the ceremonies) and one friend, who knows him well, convincingly described him as follows: "He reminds me of a garrulous, small-town dentist." Like some other people we know, he has cronies and has trustfully allowed them to run civil affairs under policies which neither Senator McCarran nor the Nation have bothered to study. Indeed, during my stay in Spain, I heard much less about Franco than about one of his old pals, Sr. Juan Antonio Suanzes, Minister of Commerce and Industry. Franco probably does not realize it, but this crony is steadily and remorselessly turning Spain into something strongly resembling National Socialism (a story which will be told in this publication later). For this reason, the U.S. should watch its step in making loans to Spain.

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FALANGE: But, if Franco is no Hitler nor Mussolini, isn't the Falange the surviving counterpart of the Fascist and Nazi parties? When I arrived in Spain, I half expected to see some of the trappings of Neutralia, that fictional totalitarian regime (supposedly modelled on those of Franco and Tito), described by Evelyn Waugh, in his recent Mr. Scott-King's Modern Europe. But I searched in vain for a Ministry of Culture and Rest, one of the funnier creations of Mr. Waugh's satire. The fact is that not only has the over-publicized Falange lost most of its colorful veneer, it has also just about lost its existence. Now, a sort of composite of various original pro-Franco elements, it survives as a shadow of its former self. One evening, I witnessed the ceremony of retreat, performed in a very sloppy manner by Falange guards wearing red berets, in back of Falange headquarters a few blocks from my hotel. The anniversary of the death of the Falange founder, Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, occurred during my stay in Madrid. I have rarely read -- even in accounts of New Deal forensic debauches -- transcripts of such blighting oratory as appeared in Arriba, the organ of the Falange. Such prose seems to have a soporific effect on the average Spaniard. Every now and then, a functionary publicly asserts that the Falange is not dead. Plain folks draw their own conclusions.

I fail to understand the fury of the Left Wing press in Britain and America against the Falange. The organization has been absorbed in a bureaucracy which has been growing as fast as those in England and the United States. Falangists are primarily interested, like New Dealers and Bloomsbury intellectuals, in participating in the meal at the public trough. Today, the Falange is held together by outworn

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sentiment, by bureaucratic considerations, by the desire to wield power over the unfortunate "common man" and to a certain extent by just plain graft. The new Spanish bureaucracy, which has thus emerged, resembles very much certain revolutionary parties in Latin-American countries. Anyone who has examined, for instance, what has happened to the old Partido Nacional Revolucionario in Mexico, formerly a militant hammer-and-sickle outfit, now a sober and prosperous job-holding elite, will know what I mean. But this deterioration (if that is the word) does not necessarily spell disintegration. A well-fed bureaucracy can help to prolong Franco's power for quite a while.

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FREEDOM AND FRANCO: The syndicates -- corporative organizations supposedly representing public, employer and employee -- is one field in which many Falangists have eased their old bones. From my Underground source (mentioned above), I learned that the workers keenly dislike the syndicates. One would imagine they would on the contrary regard them as protectors, judging by the shrill complaints of capitalists. Employers seem to consider these organizations as anti-employer and socialistic, devoted to favoring the workingman at the expense of the employer. Certainly, Sr. Giron, Franco's bull-necked Labor boss, has been pursuing a demagogic policy. In the last year, I was informed, some 200 labor disputes reached the higher tribunals, and in every case the judges decided in favor of the workers. It would appear that Franco, or his aides, had taken a leaf out of Dictator Peron's book.

But workers who try to form free Labor unions receive no mercy from the State. I heard of long, cruel sentences imposed by courts for such crimes. One never reads of these cases in the press, which is rigidly censored. Real censorship, however, does not extend to out-going wires of foreign reporters. Bureaucratic stupidity led to interference in a few cases of rather unimportant stories -- "stories", said one press man, "which would have failed to make even page 45 of the New York Times." Does this sound like Iron Curtain dictatorship?

No Iron Curtain satrapy, certainly, would allow former political enemies to return from exile. Three prominent Republican intellectuals -- Dr. Gregorio Marañon, Jose Ortega y Gasset and Ramon Perez de Ayala -- are now back in Madrid after years abroad. There are many others living again in Spain, unmolested so long as they do not agitate publicly against the regime. I gather that some make up for this forced inaction by furiously criticizing the regime in private. Some intellectuals do speak out in print, to challenge the Falange, on a purely intellectual plane; such an instance recently occurred when the Falange tried to pervert the true version of one phase of Spanish history. If the Government continues to tolerate such sprouts of independent opinion, they may blossom into something like free speech.

How can one accurately describe this mosaic? One of the best observers I found in Madrid put it this way: "If you take the picture behind the Iron Curtain as 'black', and the state of affairs in Western democratic countries as 'white', then Franco-land falls into the classification of 'gray'."

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IS FRANCO POPULAR? Recently, the London Economist reported that Franco's popularity had jumped from 40 per cent to 60 per cent of the population. I confess I don't know how such statistical estimates are made. One way of answering the question is this: it all depends on how the average Spaniard feels when he gets up in the morning. For instance, when I arrived in Madrid, people were worried because there had been no break in the deadly drought. Some Spaniards were bitterly criticizing Franco for this and for practically everything else. A week later heavy rains changed the popular mood. The self-same critics of the Caudillo now found time to say a good word for him. It is of such silly stuff that popular opinion, in Spain and elsewhere, is made. Another way to look at the matter of the ruler's popularity

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is to reflect on the fact that no attempt has ever been made on Franco's life. I talked to a foreign newspaperman who had accompanied Franco on a visit to the Asturian mines. The Asturian miners are a wild lot, formerly Left Wing; they have a playful way of tossing sticks of dynamite about when roused. My friend emphasized that Franco had virtually no security attendance on this tour of the mines and that if any miner had really wanted to, he could have blown the Caudillo to bits. I strongly suspect that, if Franco is ever murdered (and that seems unlikely), it will be at the hands, not of any member of the toiling masses, but of some tony monarchist or enraged capitalist.

But the best way to appraise Franco's hold on power is to realize what is his greatest, albeit negative, source of support. Franco is often and strongly criticized by all and sundry throughout the country. But pose the question to any critic: Do you want Franco, or do you want a repetition of the 1936 civil war? The answer is, naturally, "Franco". For in a sort of unconscious, an almost biological revulsion, the Spanish people shrink from a repetition of that experience which killed over a million people and gutted the country. No honest observer can fail to be impressed with this fundamental fact. It may be that in 10 years or 20 years, the Spanish body politic will erupt again. But not in the near future.

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FRENCH REACTIONS: In view of the foregoing picture, which is well known in Paris and London, why do the governments of Britain and France decline to recognize the Franco Government? They recognize various Latin-American dictatorships, Tito's realm, Soviet Russia and the satellite regimes. Secretary of State Dean Acheson in his statement on Spain of last spring indicated that the United States was following the lead of the Western European democratic governments. What is the key to the mystery?

I sought the answer in Paris. I found sophisticated Frenchmen well aware that Franco is not an ogre -- out of Hitler, by Mussolini -- as pictured in the Leftist press. (It would be well, also, if partisans of Franco abroad did not picture him as St. Michael, the Protecting Archangel.) Even Leftist leaders in Paris, I discovered, were well aware of this. They admitted that the opposition to recognition of Franco was a holdover from the Thirties, that Franco had become ingrained in the minds of their followers as a sort of "bogy", which even the new post-war situation could not change. Therefore, they said, the "bogy" is a live political reality. The Socialist party rank and file and the trade-union masses would strongly oppose any recognition, not to mention arms aid or loans.

These leaders (and I dare say their view is no different from that of the British Socialists) have another consideration. The editor of a Socialist paper, one of the largest dailies in Paris, put it this way to me: "I know perfectly well that Franco has become a 'bogy', and that present diplomatic relations with Spain make no sense from any international standpoint. But that is not the question. The fight to undermine the Communists all over Europe outweighs other considerations. Recognition and aid to the Franco Government would give our enemies, the Communists, a big propaganda advantage in that fight."

When I asked this Socialist whether recognition of Franco would prove any more embarrassing than did the recognition of the Greek "reactionary monarchist government" during the past four years, he said, "but Greece is far away". When I asked if the Greek angle had in any way retarded Tito in his anti-Moscow course, I got no answer. More persuasive was a seasoned old French parliamentary leader of the Right. "Bosh!", he said, "If Franco is recognized, all that will follow is a few meetings of protest, a few pieces of oratory."

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